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Abstract
This paper analyzes an inﬁnite horizon dynamic duopoly with sto-
chastic demand in which ﬁrms face costs of absorbing and processing in-
formation. Our main result is that the structure of dates at which ﬁrms
choose to absorb information diﬀer starkly between price and quantity
competition. Firms synchronize their actions under price competition
whereas they plan sequentially and in an alternating manner under
quantity competition. The reason is that under quantity competition
the planning ﬁrm reduces the uncertainty in the residual demand curve
of the inattentive ﬁrm which renders planning less attractive for that
ﬁrm. The opposite holds true under price competition.
Keywords: Inattentiveness, Price Competition, Quantity Competition,
Synchronization
JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D43, D83
∗We thank Glenn Ellison, Andreas Hauﬂer, Sven Rady, Richard Schmidtke, and Heiner
Schumacher for very helpful comments and suggestions. The second author acknowledges
ﬁnancial support from the Bavarian Graduate Programme in Economics.
†Department of Economics, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany, e-mail:
markus.reisinger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
‡Department of Economics, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany, e-mail:
ludwig.ressner@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
11 Introduction
It is a heavily discussed question in economics if competing ﬁrms choose
to synchronize their actions or if they adjust their processes at diﬀerent
times. Since the seminal papers about dynamic duopoly by Maskin and
Tirole (1987, 1988a, 1988b) this question attracted considerable attention
by researchers. The literature that addressed this question evolved along
two lines. The ﬁrst strand assumes that there is some kind of physical
friction that hinders ﬁrms from adjusting their plans each period. Thus ﬁrms
are exogenously equipped with commitment power and the mechanism that
drives the results concerning synchronization versus non-synchronization is
rooted in the assumption of strategic complementarity or substitutability
of the ﬁrms’ strategy variable. The second strand abstracts from physical
frictions but allows ﬁrms to choose to be committed for some time period.
In this paper we propose a diﬀerent perspective to look at this question.
Instead of focussing on physical frictions we set out from the assumption
that it is costly for ﬁrms to absorb and process the information they need
in order to make the right decisions. As e.g. Radner (1992) points out this
assumption is quite realistic since absorbing and processing the relevant
information for decision-making is an important goal of managerial occu-
pation. Thus the associated cost are not negligible. For several industries
this formulation is probably the more important one since changing prices
hardly involves any costs for most products and sometimes even quantities
can be easily changed. Yet, it is often much harder to determine the optimal
new price or quantity in an uncertain environment.1
In order to incorporate the feature that information processing is costly
into our analysis we assume that each time a ﬁrm wants to act on new
information it has to bear a ﬁnite positive ﬁx cost. As a consequence, ﬁrms
will absorb and process information only if the cost of doing so equals its
expected beneﬁt. If a ﬁrm rationally refrains from acting on information
during a certain time period we say that it stays rationally inattentive.
As a result we obtain that the timing pattern at which ﬁrms choose
to plan diﬀers between price and quantity competition. Firms synchronize
their actions under price competition while they plan sequentially and in
an alternating manner under quantity competition. The intuition for this
result is mainly driven by the following eﬀects. If a ﬁrm chooses to plan
under price competition it optimally increases its price in a good demand
1Recent empirical work also seems to contradict the ﬁnding the prices are adjusted
only infrequently, see e.g. Bils and Klenow (2004).
2state and lowers it in a bad demand state. Since we assume goods to be
substitutes it thereby exerts a positive externality on the other ﬁrm in the
good state and a negative one in the bad state. This increases the variance
of the demand for the other ﬁrm and renders planning more proﬁtable for
the other ﬁrm. As a result both ﬁrms plan at the same time. Under quantity
competition exactly the opposite holds true and so ﬁrms plan sequentially.
To be more precise we consider an inﬁnite horizon continuous time model
of competition between two ﬁrms who produce a diﬀerentiated good facing a
stochastic demand function. Since ﬁrms face costs of absorbing and process-
ing information they choose to plan only at some points in time and stay
inattentive in the meantime. During the inattentiveness period uncertainty
builds up in the system and ﬁrms choose their next planning dates via bal-
ancing the cost of planning and the gain obtained by having a re-optimized
plan. At its planning date a ﬁrm simultaneously decides about its next
planning date and about the path that its strategy variable follows during
its inattentiveness period. At its planning date it observes the current re-
alization of the shock, the whole history of shocks and strategy variables
but it does not observe the current value of its opponent’s strategy variable.
So at every instant ﬁrms play a one-shot Bertrand or Cournot game with
potentially diﬀerent and imperfect information. The assumption that while
planning the attentive ﬁrm does not observe the current price or quantity
of the other ﬁrm implies that there is no commitment possibility for both
ﬁrms. Thus by assuming this kind of information structure we switch oﬀ
the ”commitment eﬀect” that is crucial for the results obtained by the lit-
erature so far. What matters for our results concerning synchronization
or non-synchronization of plans is merely how the decision to plan of one
ﬁrm aﬀects the other ﬁrm’s advantage of planning. As pointed out before
this diﬀers between price and quantity competition and we derive the re-
sult that synchronization of plans is the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium
under Bertrand competition, whereas choosing to plan in an asynchronous
and alternating manner is the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium under
Cournot competition. Moreover we completely characterize the paths that
the strategy variables follow in between two consecutive planning dates.
Our analysis relates to two diﬀerent strands of the literature. The ﬁrst
strand is concerned with incorporating the assumption of costly informa-
tion processing into economic models. The paper which is closely related
to our approach of modeling inattentiveness is Reis (2006).2 He analyzes
the optimal length of a monopolist’s inattentiveness period and derives an
2See also Reis (2005) or Mankiw and Reis (2006).
3approximate solution in a general setting. He tests the models’ predictions
using US-inﬂation data and ﬁnds that his recursively state-dependent ap-
proach ﬁts the data better than previous state-contingent models do. Due
to the monopolistic setup of his model he does not address the issue of
synchronization or non-synchronization of ﬁrms.3
The second strand analyzes the question of synchronization versus non-
synchronization of ﬁrms’ decision-making. This question was ﬁrst dealt with
in a macroeconomic context by e.g. Taylor (1979, 1980) and remained to
be an important question in macroeconomics ever since. Maskin and Tirole
(1987, 1988a, 1988b) address this question in a series of inﬂuential papers
from a microeconomic perspective. They analyze a dynamic duopoly model
in which ﬁrms either compete in prices or quantities. In their analysis they
exogenously assume that ﬁrms make staggered decisions. They propose two
ways to endogenize this assumption. Yet, these two proposals lead to con-
ﬂicting answers if it comes to quantity competition which leads them to note
that ”... a more detailed study of the micro-foundations of timing in ﬁrms’
decision-making is called for, an ambitious task that will have to be deferred
to the future.” (1987, p. 962). Lau (2001) extends the Maskin and Tirole
idea via allowing players to choose whether their commitment lasts for one
or two periods. He shows that non-synchronization is the outcome of a game
in which the variables are strategic complements.4 Unfortunately, he does
not consider strategic complements in his analysis. Bhaskar (2002) provides
a model with two industries that interact with each other. Firms in each
industry are atomistic and do not act strategically but there is aggregate
strategic complementarity across industries. He shows that this can lead to
staggered price setting. All of these papers focus on the possibility of com-
mitment and therefore it is always crucial for synchronization whether ﬁrms’
strategy variables are strategic complements or substitutes.5 As pointed out
before, our paper completely abstracts from any device that could give rise
to commitment power of the ﬁrms and our results are not driven by the fact
that strategy variables are strategic complements or substitutes. What mat-
ters in our context is how the action of a planning ﬁrm aﬀects the other ﬁrm’s
demand uncertainty and so the only aspect that is important is whether a
3There are other approaches for modeling inattentiveness. For example, Sims (2003,
2005) proposes an approach in which agents are attentive in all periods but can only absorb
parts of the incoming information. This approach is used e.g. by Moscarini (2004).
4A model that is similar in spirit but looks at wage setting is provided by de Fraja
(1993).
5For a recent treatment of dynamic duopoly, that does not focus on synchronization,
see Jun and Vives (2004).
4planning ﬁrm’s choice exerts a positive externality on the other ﬁrm (as it is
the case in price competition) or a negative one (as it is the case in quantity
competition).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model.
In Section 3 we characterize the strategy variables’ optimal paths. Section
4 analyzes the equilibrium structure of planning dates under Cournot and
Bertrand competition. We discuss two possible extensions in Section 5 and
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two ﬁrms denoted by i = 1,2. Each ﬁrm i produces a diﬀerentiated
perishable good at zero marginal cost.6 Each ﬁrm faces an inverse demand
curve
pi









t, i 6= j (1)
at date t, with α > 0, and β > γ ≥ 0. Fluctuations in market demand
are represented by θt whose evolution is governed by a geometric Brownian
motion
dθt = σθtdzt, with θ0 = 1, (2)
The drift rate is zero and dzt is a standard Wiener process. Therefore θt has
an expected value of θ0 and a variance of θ2
0(eσ2t − 1), with 0 < σ2 < ∞.
The chosen representation of the inverse demand curve reﬂects the eﬀects
that ﬂuctuations of the market sentiment have: An increase in θ increases
market size (it ﬂattens the demand curve) and consumers’ willingness to
pay (increases the intercept) and vice versa.7 Firms compete for an inﬁnite
period of time and we distinguish two cases, namely either price competition
or quantity competition.
As mentioned before it is costly to absorb and process information and so
a ﬁrm decides to remain uninformed about the true state of the world θt in
some time intervals. Whenever a ﬁrm updates her information and adjusts
her price or quantity to the new information she faces a ﬁnite adjustment
cost of K ≥ 0. A ﬁrm decides at which time periods she plans in order to
6As Singh and Vives (1984) show, the analysis would not change if ﬁrms faced positive
constant marginal costs c because this would only lower the eﬀective intercept from α to
a = α − c.
7Our results hold as long as we assume that shocks are positively correlated. We
assume the shocks to be perfectly positively correlated in order to simplify the following
analysis.
5adjust her price or quantity path. We denote planning dates by Di(k), with
Di(k) : N0 → R. If at date Di(k−1) a ﬁrm plans then the time that elapses
up to its next adjusting date is di(k) = Di(k) − Di(k − 1) and we call di(k)
the inattentiveness period of ﬁrm i.
If ﬁrm i decides to plan at date Di(k) it observes the current shock
θDi(k). Moreover, it also learns the whole history of the shock realizations
θt from Di(k − 1) to Di(k) and all the rival’s prices p
j
t or quantities q
j
t that





Di(k) of its rival. It can only make an inference about the price
or quantity that its rival sets at Di(k).
What matters for this inference is illustrated in a simple example. If
both ﬁrms plan simultaneously at Di(k − 1) and Di(k), then E[s
j
t], where
sı{p,q}, with Di(k) > t > Di(k − 1), is conditional on θDi(k−1) the state
of the world that both ﬁrms observe while planning and on the time that
elapses since the last planning date t − Di(k − 1).8 Firms need both pieces
of information to calculate the expected value of θt.
At its planning date Di(k) ﬁrm i makes two decisions: Firstly, it de-
termines the complete path of prices or quantities from today until its











t=Di(k). Secondly, it decides about its next plan-
ning date because it will not gain any further information in between.
Thus if the last planning date of ﬁrm i was Di(k) then the expected















if ﬁrms compete in prices. If ﬁrms compete in quantities, instead, ﬁrm i0s















The equilibrium concept we employ is Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
8In the following we will denote the expectation conditional on the information at the
current planning date by E[·].
63 Characterization of Optimal Paths
Before analyzing the planning decisions of ﬁrms we must determine the
optimal (price or quantity) path that a ﬁrm chooses in between planning
dates. In this section we characterize the path under the assumption that
ﬁrms synchronize their actions.9 This is instructive since it reveals that the
paths diﬀer starkly between price and quantity competition although ﬁrms
gain no further information in between planning dates.
Proposition 1. If ﬁrms plan simultaneously and observe θ0 at D(0) = 0,













if ﬁrm j does not plan in the meantime.
Proof: Suppose that ﬁrms plan simultaneously at D(0) = 0, and observe
θ0. Further assume, that both plan simultaneously at some D(1) > 0.
Now ﬁrms have to determine the path that their strategy variable should
follow during the inattentiveness period. At date 0 ﬁrm i solves either (3)
or (4) for each instant t in this inattentiveness interval conditional on the
information that both ﬁrms plan simultaneously at 0 and D(1). Moreover,
it knows that both ﬁrms observe θ0, and that at t the information about
θ0 is outdated by t periods for both ﬁrms. This implies that ﬁrms form
symmetric expectations about θt and the strategy chosen by the opponent.
Thus at each instant during their inattentiveness period ﬁrms end up playing
the static Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium with imperfect but symmetric









θ0eσ2t yields (5) and (6). 
The intuition behind the result, that the quantity path is decreasing
in the variance whereas the price path is increasing in the variance can be
easily described in a stylized setting in which the realization of the shock is
9The description of the strategy variables’ optimal paths for the case in which one ﬁrm
plans in the meantime is provided in Section 4.2.1.
7either high or low with equal probability. A positive shock shifts the demand
curve outward and it becomes ﬂatter, whereas the reverse holds true for a
negative shock. With ﬁxed prices the proﬁt of ﬁrm i increases in a good
demand state by more than it decreases in a bad demand state. Thus the
size of the market increases on average in the variance of the shock. Due to
our assumption about the stochastic process the variance increases linearly
in time and so the expected size of the market increases in the time that
passed since the last planning date. Price-setting ﬁrms react optimally to
that increase by choosing an increasing price path.
With ﬁxed quantities the reverse holds true, since the proﬁt of ﬁrm i
increases in a good demand state by less than it decreases in a bad de-
mand state. Thus the expected size of the market decreases in the time
that elapsed since the last planning date. Thus quantity-setting ﬁrms react
optimally to this shrinking by reducing its quantity.
4 Characterization of Planning Dates
4.1 The Optimality Condition
Now we turn to the characterization of optimal planning dates. Each ﬁrm
i maximizes its expected present discounted (at the rate r > 0) value of













via choosing an inﬁnite sequence of planning dates {Di(k)}∞
k=1. Note that
if the costs of planning are zero, ﬁrm i chooses to be always attentive.
This problem has a recursive structure between planning dates. Let Di
and Di0 denote the current and the next planning date of ﬁrm i, then we
can restate the problem for any Di,Di0, i ∈ {1,2} that satisfy Di ≤ Dj <
Di0 ≤ Dj0 as



















and similarly for ﬁrm 2. V 1(·) is ﬁrm 10s value function if it is about to
decide and if the next planning date of ﬁrm 2 is D2. Similarly W1(·) is ﬁrm
10s value function if ﬁrm 2 is about to decide and ﬁrm 1 moves next at D10.
Standard results imply that the diﬀerentiability of the payoﬀ functions
carries over to the value functions V 1(·) and W1(·). Thus the ﬁrst-order











From (10) it is evident that we need to derive a simple equation for
W1(·) in order to get an analytical expression of the problem’s ﬁrst order












































































The intuition contained in the ﬁrst order condition can be nicely pre-
sented in the framework of a discrete time approximation. Each instant ﬁrm
i trades oﬀ whether it should plan today or postpone planning to the next
instant. If it plans today it instantaneously reaps the proﬁt from having a
fresh plan and incurs planning cost. Furthermore it re-optimizes the plan
that its strategy variable takes until its next planning date. Due to the re-
cursive structure of the problem it merely considers the expected discounted
proﬁts from now until the consecutive planning date of its opponent. From
the perspective of ﬁrm i0s last adjustment date the expected proﬁts of plan-















If it did not plan today but waits for 4t periods, it instantaneously gets the
proﬁts from following an outdated plan. At the next instant it earns the
expected proﬁt from having a fresh plan and incurs planning costs. After re-
optimizing its plan it also considers the expected discounted proﬁts from now
until the consecutive planning date of its opponent. From the perspective
of ﬁrm i0s last adjustment date the expected proﬁts of postponing planning





















Subtracting (14) from (15) and letting 4t → 0 yields (13).












10net of adjustment cost. The sign of the value of planning is positive since it
is better to act on precise information. The term on the right hand side of
(13) warrants some discussion as well. As pointed out in the discrete time
approximation the derivative represents the diﬀerence in expected proﬁts
between planning an instant later and planning today at each instant be-
tween the current planning date of ﬁrm i and the next planning date of ﬁrm
j. Since planning tomorrow implies that the plan that ﬁrm i sets is at each
instant less outdated than the plan that it would set if it plans today, we
expect this diﬀerence to be positive too.
The basic trade-oﬀ between planning today or waiting until tomorrow
is always the same for both ﬁrms irrespective of the mode of competition
and the opponent’s decision whether it wants to plan at the same instant or
not. However both aspects inﬂuence heavily how the structure of planning
dates will look like in equilibrium. Before we characterize the structure of
planning dates under Bertrand and Cournot competition in section 4.3 we
turn to the analytical derivation of the terms contained in (13) in the next
section.
4.2 Analytical derivation
4.2.1 Value of planning
In this section we characterize the value of planning under Bertrand and
Cournot competition. Before being able to to do so we establish a general
Lemma for calculating the expectation about the product of two random
variables at diﬀerent points in time which turns out to be important for
this proof. This is done in the Appendix in Lemma 1. We look at the
value of planning for two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario both ﬁrms plan
simultaneously whereas in the second ﬁrms plan sequentially. Proposition 2
ﬁrst states the result obtained under Bertrand competition.
Proposition 2 Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in
prices. Firm i0s value of planning is higher if ﬁrm j plans at the same
instant than if ﬁrm j does not plan at the same instant.
Proof:
Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in prices, plan si-
multaneously for the ﬁrst time at D(0) = 0 and observe θ0.
First we determine the expected instantaneous proﬁt of having a fresh
plan. If ﬁrm i plans for the second time at some future instant u it observes




u + αθu) + β(αθu − pi
u))
β2 − γ2 , (16)
by choosing the optimal pi





u − αθu) + αβθu
2β
. (17)







Thus the corresponding expected proﬁt equals
β(β − γ)θ3
0e3σ2uα2
(β + γ)(2β − γ)2 , (18)
if both ﬁrms plan simultaneously.
If ﬁrm j plans for the second time at s < u whereas it does not plan at u
it solves the following problem in order to determine the optimal p2
u. Firstly,
it forms expectations about the best response of ﬁrm i in u conditional on
the state of the world that it observed while planning for the last time (θu)
and the time that elapsed between its last planning date and u, i.e. u − s.





u − αθu) + αβθu
2β
. (19)
Secondly, it has to determine its own best response. In order to do that







u + αθu) + β(αθu − p
j
u))






uβ + θseσ2(u−s)βα + γE[pi
u] − θseσ2(u−s)γα)
β2 − γ2 .
12Maximizing this with respect to p
j
u yields that ﬁrm j0s best response is
pj
u =










α(β − γ)θs(2eσ2(u−s)β + γ)
4β2 − γ2 . (21)
Since ﬁrm i knows u−s and observes θs while planning at u, it can forecast
the best response of ﬁrm j in u. This implies that it determines its own best
reply by using (21) in (17). Thus pi
u is given by
pi
u =
α(β − γ)(γ2θs − γ2θu + 2θseσ2(u−s)βγ + 4θuβ2)
2β(4β2 − γ2)
. (22)
Plugging (22) and (21) in (16) yields that the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i is
given by
α2θu(β − γ)(γ2(θs − θu) + 2θseσ2(u−s)βγ + 4θuβ2)
4(β + γ)β(4β2 − γ2)2 .
Thus the expected proﬁt from having a fresh plan if the other ﬁrm does not
plan at the same instant is equal to
α2θ3
0(β − γ)
e2σ2s4(β + γ)β(4β2 − γ2)2

(4β2 − γ2)2eσ2(3u+2s)









0 exp(σ2(2s + u)), and E[θ3
u|θ0] = θ3
0 exp(3σ2u).
Now we determine the expected instantaneous proﬁt of having an out-
dated plan. If ﬁrm i does not plan at u it maximizes its expected proﬁt
pi
uθ0(pi
uβ + θseσ2uβα + γp
j
u − θ0eσ2uγα)
β2 − γ2 , (24)
by choosing the optimal pi





u] + αθ0eσ2u(β − γ)
2β
. (25)
13If ﬁrm j plans for the second time at u, then i expects the best response of




u + αθ0(β − γ)
2β
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αθ0(β − γ)(2β + γeσ2u)
(4β2 − γ2)
. (28)
Plugging (27) and (28) in (24) yields that the expected proﬁt of following
an outdated plan if the opponent ﬁrm plans at this instant is given by
θ3
0α2β(2βeσ2u + γ)2(β − γ)
(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2)2 . (29)
Now consider the situation in which ﬁrm j does plan at date s < u but does




u + αθ0eσ2u(β − γ)
2β
. (30)











αθ0(β − γ)(2βeσ2u + γeσ2u)
(4β2 − γ2)
. (32)
Plugging (31) and (32) in (24) yields that the expected proﬁt of following
an outdated plan if the opponent ﬁrm does not plan at this instant is given
by
θ3
0α2β(2βeσ2u + γeσ2u)2(β − γ)
(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2)2 . (33)
Now we are in the position to state the expected value of planning for
the considered scenarios. The expected value of planning at some future




4(β + γ)β(4β2 − γ2)2

16β4(e3σ2u − e2σ2u) + 16β3γ(eσ2(2u+s) − eσ2(2u−s))
+ 4β2γ2(eσ2(2u+s) + 2eσ2(u+2s) − 2e3σ2u − e2σ2(u−s))




if ﬁrm j does not plan at the same instant. Whereas if ﬁrm j also plans at
u ﬁrm i0s expected value of planning is given by the diﬀerence between (29)
and (18), which is equal to
β(β − γ)θ3
0α2






Subtracting (34) from (35) yields
α2θ3
0(β − γ)γ
4(β + γ)β(4β2 − γ2)2

16β3(e3σ2u + eσ2(2u−s) − eσ2(2u+s) − eσ2u)
+ 4β2γ(3e3σ2u + e2σ2(u−s) − 2eσ2(u+2s) − eσ2(2u+s) − 1)




which is positive if u > s ≥ 0. 
Proposition 3 states the result which is obtained if ﬁrms compete in
quantities.
Proposition 3 Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in
quantities. Firm i0s value of planning is higher if ﬁrm j does not plan at
the same instant than if ﬁrm j plans at the same instant.
Proof: The derivation of expected proﬁts follows the same logic as pre-
sented in the Proof of Proposition 3 and is therefore omitted. Here we
merely state the analytical expressions.
Firm i0s expected instantaneous proﬁt of having a fresh plan at some





eσ2(5u+2s)(8β4 − 4β2γ2 + γ4)




15if ﬁrm j does not plan at the same instant. Whereas if ﬁrm j also plans at
u, ﬁrm i0s expected instantaneous proﬁt of having a fresh plan is
α2θ3
0e3σ2uβ
(2β + γ)2 . (38)
Firm i0s expected instantaneous proﬁt of having an outdated plan at
some future instant u is given by
α2θ3
0β(2βeσ2(u−s) − γeσ2(u+s))2
eσ2(3u−2s)(4β2 − γ2)2 , (39)
if ﬁrm j does not plan at the same instant. Whereas if ﬁrm j plans at u
then ﬁrm i0s expected instantaneous proﬁt of having an outdated plan is
α2θ3
0β(2β − γe2σ2u)2
(4β2 − γ2)2eσ2u . (40)






8β4(e3σ2u − e−σ2u) + 8β3γ(e−σ2(u−2s) − e−σ2(u−4s))
+ 4β2γ2(eσ2(u+2s) − e3σ2u) + 2βγ3(e−σ2(u−4s) − eσ2(u+2s))




if ﬁrm j does not plan at the same instant. Whereas if ﬁrm j plans at u
then ﬁrm i0s expected value of planning at this instant is
α2θ3
0β2((β − γ)e3σ2u − βe−σ2u + γeσ2u)
(4β2 − γ2)2 > 0. (42)





8β3(e3σ2u − eσ2u − e−σ2(u−4s) + e−σ2(u−2s))
+ 4β2γ(eσ2(u+2s) − e3σ2u) + 2βγ2(e−σ2(u−4s) − eσ2(u+2s))
























Figure 1: Comparison of the value of planning under Cournot competition
We provide the intuition behind both results in a stylized setting in which
market demand is either high or low with equal probability.
First consider the situation in which ﬁrms compete in quantities. Both
ﬁrms plan simultaneously at date 0 and decide about their next planning
date. The value of planning of ﬁrm 1 at some future date t given that ﬁrm
2 does not plan at the same instant is depicted by the distance between
the solid lines in Figure 1. Now suppose, that ﬁrm 2 would plan at this
instant. If demand decreased ﬁrm 2 chooses to produce a smaller quantity
than without planning. As a consequence prices increase compared to the
situation in which ﬁrm 2 does not plan and thus the decrease in proﬁts of
ﬁrm 1 is ameliorated. The converse holds true if the shock to market demand
would have been positive. In total, however, by planning ﬁrm 2 reduces the
expected incorrectness of ﬁrm 10s plan, which is depicted by the distance
between the dotted lines in Figure 1. This in turn implies, that the losses
from being inattentive for ﬁrm 1 decrease. Therefore it has an incentive to
postpone planning if ﬁrm 2 plans at the same instant.
Now consider the situation in which ﬁrms compete in prices, both ﬁrms
plan simultaneously at date 0 and decide about their next planning date.
The value of planning of ﬁrm 1 at some future date given that ﬁrm 2 does
not plan at the same instant is depicted by the diﬀerence between the solid
lines in Figure 2. Now suppose, that ﬁrm 2 would plan at this instant. If
there was a negative shock to market demand ﬁrm 2 would set a lower price.




















Figure 2: Comparison of the value of planning under Bertrand competition
without planning of ﬁrm 2. In the case of a positive demand shock ﬁrm 2
would amplify the positive consequences for ﬁrm 1. In total, however, by
planning ﬁrm 2 increases the expected incorrectness of ﬁrm 10s plan, which
is depicted by the distance between the dotted lines in Figure 2. This in turn
implies, that the losses from being inattentive for ﬁrm 1 increase. Therefore
it has an even higher incentive to plan at date t if ﬁrm 2 also plans at this
instant.
The intuition underlying the Proof of Proposition 2 and 3 immediately
implies the following result that completes the characterization of optimal
paths.
Corollary Consider the situation in which ﬁrm i plans at u whereas
ﬁrm j stays inattentive at this instant. The path of the strategy variable
that the inattentive ﬁrm sets jumps downward at u, irrespective of the mode
of competition.
Proof Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms plan simultaneously
at D(0) = 0 and observe some θ0. If ﬁrms compete in prices and if ﬁrm i
plans at some future instant u then the optimal price of ﬁrm j is
pj
u =
αθ0(β − γ)(2βeσ2u + γ)
(4β2 − γ2)
, (44)
18whereas the optimal price of ﬁrm j is given by
pj
u =
αθ0(β − γ)(2β + γ)eσ2u
(4β2 − γ2)
, (45)
if ﬁrm i does not plan at u. Clearly (45) exceeds (44).
If ﬁrms compete in quantities and if ﬁrm i plans at some future instant





(4β2 − γ2)eσ2u , (46)







if ﬁrm i does not plan at u. Clearly (47) exceeds (46). 
The intuition behind this result is the following. It follows from Propo-
sition 1 that the quantity path of an inattentive ﬁrm decreases in the in-
correctness of its plan. Now if one ﬁrm plans while the other one remains
inattentive, the planning ﬁrm reduces the expected incorrectness of the non-
planning ﬁrm’s plan. This eﬀect leads to an increase in the quantity set by
the inattentive ﬁrm. However, there is a second countervailing eﬀect. Since
the attentive ﬁrm observes the true state of the world it chooses a quan-
tity that is higher than the one it would have chosen without planning. As
shown in Proposition 1, this is the case because the optimal action under
Cournot competition is to set a larger quantity with full information that
with imperfect information. As quantities are strategic substitutes this ef-
fect leads to a decrease in the quantity set by the inattentive ﬁrm. Since
the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one, we have that the quantity set by
the inattentive ﬁrm is lower if the other ﬁrm is attentive compared to the
situation in which it would remain inattentive as well.
The second statement contained in Proposition 1 states that the price
path of an inattentive ﬁrm increases in the variance. Now if one ﬁrm plans
while the other ﬁrm remains inattentive, the planning ﬁrm increases the
expected incorrectness of the non-planning ﬁrm’s plan. This eﬀect leads to
an increase in the price set by the inattentive ﬁrm. Again the second eﬀect
works in the other direction. As shown in Proposition 1 the attentive ﬁrm
observes the true state of the world and so charges a smaller price than
it would have chosen without full information. Thus the inattentive ﬁrm
19expects the attentive ﬁrm to reduce its price. Since prices are strategic
substitutes the inattentive ﬁrm reduces its price as well. Again the second
eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one, which delivers the result that the inattentive
ﬁrm’s price is smaller if the other ﬁrm is attentive compared to the situation
in which the other ﬁrm remains inattentive as well.
After having derived analytical expressions for the instantaneous proﬁts
we turn to the analysis of the intertemporal eﬀects in the subsequent section.
4.2.2 Intertemporal eﬀects
First consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in prices. The
following Lemma presents the analytical representation of the intertemporal
eﬀects. We determine the gain in the future from postponing planning by
one instant. As mentioned before this gain accrues because the ﬁrm has a
plan that is an instant closer to the optimum in all future periods till its
next planning date. We look at this gain in two diﬀerent scenarios, namely
simultaneous and sequential planning.
Lemma 2 Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in prices.





4β(2σ2 − r)(4β2 − γ2)2(β + γ)

16β4(eu(3σ2−r) − eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v)
+ 16β3γ(e(3σ2−r)u − eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v) + 8β2γ2(eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v − e(3σ2−r)u)
+ 4βγ3(e2σ2s−σ2u+(2σ2−r)v + eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v − e(σ2−r)u+2σ2s − e(3σ2−r)u)
+ γ4(e(3σ2−r)u + 2e3σ2s−2σ2u+(2σ2−r)v − 2e(3σ2−r)u − eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v,
(48)
where v, with u < v, denotes the next planning date of ﬁrm j. Under
simultaneous planning the diﬀerence in expected proﬁts per instant of ﬁrm i
is represented by
α2θ3
0σ2(β − γ)(eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v − e(3σ2−r)u)
4(2σ2 − r)β(β + γ)
. (49)
Proof:
Consider the following situation. Firm i plans at some future instant
u and ﬁrm j’s current planning date is s and it plans next at some future
20instant v, with s < u < v. Then the expected instantaneous proﬁt of ﬁrm i
at some instant τ, with u < τ ≤ v is given by
α2θ3
0(β − γ)e2σ2(τ−u−s)
4β(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2)2

16β4eσ2(3u+2s) + 16β3γeσ2(3u+2s)
+ 4β2γ2(3eσ2(2u+3s) − 2eσ2(3u+2s)) + 4βγ3(eσ2(u+4s) − eσ2(3u+2s))




If ﬁrm i would instead postpone planning for one instant and plans at u0 =
u + 4t, then its expected instantaneous proﬁt at some instant τ, with u0 <
τ ≤ v is given by
α2θ3
0(β − γ)e2σ2(τ−(u+4t)−s)
4β(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2)2

16β4eσ2(3(u+4t)+2s) + 16β3γeσ2(3(u+4t)+2s)
+ 4β2γ2(3eσ2(2(u+4t)+3s) − 2eσ2(3(u+4t)+2s)) + 4βγ3(eσ2((u+4t)+4s) − eσ2(3(u+4t)+2s))




Subtracting (50) from (51), dividing the diﬀerence by 4t, letting 4t → 0 ,
and integrating the resulting expression over τ from u to v yields (48).
Consider now the following situation. Firm i and ﬁrm j plan simulta-
neously at some future instant u. Firm j plans next at some future instant
v, with u < v. Then the expected instantaneous proﬁt of ﬁrm i at some
instant τ, with u < τ ≤ v is given by
α2θ3
0β(β − γ)eσ2(2τ+u)
(2β − γ)2(β + γ)
. (52)
If ﬁrm i would instead postpone planning for one instant and plans at u0 =
u + 4t, then its expected instantaneous proﬁt at some instant τ, with u0 <
τ ≤ v is given by
α2θ3
0(β − γ)e2σ2τ
4β(β + γ)(2β − γ)2e2σ2(u+4t)

4β2e3σ2(u+4t) + 4βγ(eσ2(3u+24t) − e3σ2(u+4t))




Subtracting (52) from (53), dividing the diﬀerence by 4t and letting 4t → 0
and integrating the resulting expression over τ from u to v yields (49). 
21Now consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in quantities.
The following Lemma presents the analytical representation of the intertem-
poral eﬀects in the scenarios of simultaneous and sequential planning.
Lemma 3 Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in quan-
tities. Under sequential planning ﬁrm i0s diﬀerence in expected proﬁts per
instant is represented by
α2θ3
0σ2(eσ2v − e(σ2+r)u−rv)e(3σ2−r)u−σ2v
(r + σ2)β(4β2 − γ2)2
×





where v, with u < v denotes the next planning date of ﬁrm j. Under si-
multaneous planning the diﬀerence in expected proﬁts per instant of ﬁrm i
is represented by
α2θ3
0σ2(8β3 + 4β2γ − γ3)(eσ2v − e(σ2+r)u−rv)e(3σ2−r)u−σ2v
(r + σ2)β(8β3 + 4β2γ − 2βγ2 − γ3)
. (55)
Proof:
Consider the following situation. Firm i plans at some future instant
u and ﬁrm j0s current planning date is s and it plans next at some future
instant v, with s < u < v. Then the expected instantaneous proﬁt of ﬁrm i






+ 2β2γ2(2eσ2(2u+2s−τ) − 2eσ2(4u−τ) + eσ2(4s−τ))




If ﬁrm i would instead postpone planning for one instant and plans at u0 =
u + 4t, then its expected instantaneous proﬁt at some instant τ, with u0 <






+ 2β2γ2(2eσ2(3(u+4t)+4s) + eσ2((u+4t)+6s) − 2eσ2(5(u+4t)+2s))
+ 2βγ3(eσ2((u+4t)+6s) − eσ2(3(u+4t)+4s))




Subtracting (56) from (57), dividing the diﬀerence by 4t, letting 4t → 0 ,
and integrating the resulting expression over τ from u to v yields (54).
Consider now the following situation. Firm i and ﬁrm j plan simulta-
neously at some future instant u. Firm j plans next at some future instant
v, with u < v. Then the expected instantaneous proﬁt of ﬁrm i at some
instant τ, with u < τ ≤ v is given by
α2θ3
0βe3σ2u
(2β + γ)2eσ2(τ−u). (58)
If ﬁrm i would instead postpone planning for one instant and plans at u0 =
u + 4t, then its expected instantaneous proﬁt at some instant τ, with u0 <






+ 4β2γ2(eσ2(3u+4t) − 2eσ2(3u+54t) + 2e3σ2(u+4t))




Subtracting (58) from (59), dividing the diﬀerence by 4t and letting 4t → 0
and integrating the resulting expression over τ from u to v yields (55). 
After having derived the analytical expressions for the terms contained
in the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem the stage is set
to present the equilibrium planning decision of ﬁrms under Bertrand and
Cournot competition.
4.3 Equilibria under Bertrand and Cournot competition
As pointed out before we are interested in the question whether ﬁrms plan
simultaneously or sequentially. We assume that under both regimes both
23ﬁrms have to plan simultaneously for the ﬁrst time at D(0) = 0 where they
observe θ0. If both ﬁrms keep on planning jointly we denote the second
planning date by u and the third by v. If ﬁrms choose to plan sequentially
we assume that ﬁrm j starts. We denote ﬁrm j’s second planning date by s
and its third planning date by v. Firm i0s second planning date is denoted
by u, with 0 < s < u < v.
From introspection of (13) it is evident, that ﬁrm i0s optimal second
planning date u is a function of ﬁrm j0s next planning date v and its last
planning date, which is either s in the sequential scenario or 0 in the simul-
taneous scenario. The same holds true for ﬁrm j0s optimal second planning
date. In other words each ﬁrm tries to choose the optimal distance between
its current planning date and the prior and next planning dates of its rival.
Due to the recursive structure at each planning date a ﬁrm faces the same
trade-oﬀ in expectations formed at date 0. Moreover, the recursive structure
implies that the trade-oﬀ that ﬁrm j faces in determining its second planning
date is from the perspective of period 0 identical to the trade-oﬀ that ﬁrm i
faces when it has to determine its second one. This reasoning implies, that
we can draw on the recursive structure of the game in order to determine
the equilibrium distance of planning dates.
Thus under the simultaneous regime the equilibrium distance between v
and u is given by
v − u = u. (60)
The reason for this result is the following. If it is optimal for both ﬁrms
to plan after u periods, then from the perspective of period 0, it should be
optimal for them to plan simultaneously after 2u periods for the third time.
Under the sequential regime the equilibrium distance between v and u
is given by
v − u = u − s. (61)
The reason is that from the perspective of period 0 ﬁrm j0s decision about
v at s is identical to the trade-oﬀ that ﬁrm i faces when it decides about
the distance between u and s. Thus if it is optimal for ﬁrm i to plan u − s
periods after s, then it is, from the perspective of period 0, optimal for ﬁrm
j to choose the same distance between v and u.
However, before we set out to determine how the structure of equilibrium
planning dates will look like under Bertrand and Cournot competition, we
have to determine ﬁrm j0s optimal second planning date s conditional on
ﬁrm i planning at u, with 0 < s < u.
244.3.1 Optimal second planning date under sequential planning
The results are summarized in the following Lemmata.
Lemma 4 Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in prices
and are required to plan sequentially. For every second planning date u of
ﬁrm i there exists a unique optimal second planning date of ﬁrm j, denoted





4(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2)2

16β4(e3σ2s − e2σ2s) + 8β2γ2(eσ2s − e3σ2s)











+ 8β2γ2(e5σ2s + e3σ2s − e(2σ2−r)u+(3σ2+r)s − e(2σ2−r)u+(σ2+r)s)
+ 4βγ3(e3σ2s − e(2σ2−r)u+(σ2+r)s)
+ γ4(e(2σ2−r)u+(3σ2+r)s + 2e(2σ2−r)u+(σ2+r)s + 2e2σ2s − 2e3σ2s − e5σ2s − 2e(2σ2−r)u+rs).
(62)
Moreover s?(u) is increasing in u.
Proof Equation (62) is derived by using (48) and (34) in (13). Now we
need to show that an optimal s exists. Let the left hand side of (62) be
denoted by ψ(s), whereas the right hand side of (62) is denoted by κ(s,u).
We can show that
lim
s→0





0σ2(8β3 − 4β2γ − 6βγ2 + γ3)(β − γ)(e(2σ2−r)u − 1)
4β(2σ2 − r)(2β + γ)(2β − γ)2 ,
which is bigger than zero if γ < γ0 and smaller than zero if β > γ ≥ γ0,
where γ0 is deﬁned by
8β3 − 4β2γ0 − 6β(γ0)2 + (γ0)3 = 0
25Thus we require |−rK| to be suﬃciently high such that it is strictly bigger







4β(4β2 − γ2)2(β + γ)

16β4(4e2σ2s − 4eσ2s)










4β(2σ2 − r)(4β2 − γ2)2(β + γ)e(2σ2−r)s

16β4σ2(e((2σ2−r)u+3σ2+r)s − 4e5σ2s) + 16rβ4e5σ2s
+ 8β2γ2σ2(3e5σ2s + e3σ2s + e(2σ2−r)u+(σ2+r)s − e(2σ2−r)u+(3σ2+r)s)
− 8β2γ2r(e3σ2s + e5σ2s) + 4βγ3σ2(e(2σ2−r)u+(σ2+r)s + e3σ2s)
− 4rβγ3e3σ2s + rγ4(2e3σ2s + e5σ2s + 2e2σ2s)




is strictly negative, we have shown that for every u there exists a unique s,
denoted by s?(u), that solves (62). Moreover it can be shown that |
∂κ(s,u)
∂s |
is bigger than |
∂ψ(s)
∂s |. Thus the second order condition indicates that s?(u)
is a maximum.






4β(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2)2e(2σ2+r)s

16β4e(2σ2−r)u+(3σ2+r)s
− 8β2γ2(e(2σ2−r)u+(3σ2+r)s − e(2σ2−r)u+(σ2+r)s) − 4βγ3e(2σ2−r)u+(σ2+r)s




is strictly positive it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that s?(u)
is increasing in u. 
26Lemma 5 Consider the situation in which both ﬁrms compete in quan-
tities and are required to plan sequentially. For every second planning date
u of ﬁrm i there exists a unique optimal second planning date of ﬁrm j,







β4(e4σ2s − 1) + 4β2γ2(e2σ2s − e4σ2s)







(r + σ2)β(4β2 − γ2)2
×





Moreover s??(u) is increasing in u.
Proof Equation (66) is derived by using (55) and (38) in (13). Now we
need to show that an optimal s exists. Let the left hand side of (66) be
denoted by χ(s), whereas the right hand side of (66) is denoted by φ(s,u).
We can show that
lim
s→0





0σ2(8β3 + 4β2γ − γ3)(eσ2u − e−ru)
β(r + σ2)(8β3 + 4β2γ − 2βγ2 − γ2eσ2u > 0.




















β(r + σ2)(4β2 − γ2)2

16β4σ2(3eσ2(u+2s) − 4e(3σ2+r)s−ru) − 16rβ4eσ2(σ2(u+2s))
+ 4β2γ2σ2(eσ2u − 2e(σ2+r)s−ru + 8e(3σ2+r)s−ru − 6eσ2(u+2s))
+ 4β2γ2r(2eσ2(u+2s) − eσ2u) + 2βγ3σ2(2e(σ2+r)s−ru − eσ2u)
+ 2rβγ3eσ2u + rγ4(eσ2u − 2eσ2(u+2s))




is strictly negative, we have shown that for every u there exists a unique s,
denoted by s??(u), that solves (66). Moreover it can be shown that |
∂φ(s,u)
∂s |
is bigger than |
∂χ(s)
∂s |. Thus the second order condition indicates that s??(u)
is a maximum.












is strictly positive it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that s??(u)
is increasing in u. 
Now the stage is set to determine the equilibrium structure of planning
dates under Bertrand and Cournot competition in the following section.
4.3.2 Equilibrium structure of planning dates under Bertrand
competition
Proposition 4 contains one of the two main results of this analysis.
Proposition 4 Consider the situation in which ﬁrms compete in prices
and plan simultaneously at D(0) = 0. Then simultaneous planning consti-
tutes the unique equilibrium.
28Proof If both ﬁrms set prices and plan simultaneously at some future





(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2)2

4β2(e3σ2u − e2σ2u) + 4βγ(e3σ2u − eσ2u)






0σ2(β − γ)(eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v − e(3σ2−r)u)
4(2σ2 − r)β(β + γ)
.
(70)
Along similar lines as in the proofs of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 it can be
shown, that for every third planning date v of ﬁrm j there exists a unique
u?(v) that is increasing in v. Using that the equilibrium distance between
planning dates implies that v = 2u in (70) yields that simultaneous planning
on behalf of the ﬁrms is indeed an equilibrium.
Now consider the scenario with sequential planning. If ﬁrm j plans for
the second time at some future instant s and for the third time at some
future instant v then the condition that determines ﬁrm i0s optimal second





4(β + γ)β(4β2 − γ2)2

16β4(e3σ2u − e2σ2u) + 16β3γ(eσ2(2u+s) − eσ2(2u−s))
+ 4β2γ2(eσ2(2u+s) + 2eσ2(u+2s) − 2e3σ2u − e2σ2(u−s))








4β(2σ2 − r)(4β2 − γ2)2(β + γ)

16β4(eu(3σ2−r) − eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v)
+ 16β3γ(e(3σ2−r)u − eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v) + 8β2γ2(eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v − e(3σ2−r)u)
+ 4βγ3(e2σ2s−σ2u+(2σ2−r)v + eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v − e(σ2−r)u+2σ2s − e(3σ2−r)u)
+ γ4(e(3σ2−r)u + 2e3σ2s−2σ2u+(2σ2−r)v − 2e(3σ2−r)u − eσ2u+(2σ2−r)v.
(71)
Again it can be shown along similar lines as in the proofs of Lemma 4 and
Lemma 5, that for every second planning date s and every third planning
date v of ﬁrm j there exists a unique u??(v,s) that is increasing in v and
decreasing in s. However, sequential planning can only be an equilibrium
if (71) and (62) are jointly satisﬁed for some (s,u,v)-combination, which
fulﬁlls the requirement that the equilibrium distance of planning dates under
29sequential planning implies that v = 2u − s. It can be shown, that there
is no (s,u,v)-combination satisfying v = 2u − s for which (71) and (62)
are jointly fulﬁlled. Thus there exists no equilibrium in which ﬁrms plan
sequentially under Bertrand competition. 
The next section determines the equilibrium structure of planning dates
under Cournot competition.
4.3.3 Equilibrium structure of planning dates under Cournot com-
petition
Proposition 5 contains the second main result of this analysis.
Proposition 5 Consider the situation in which ﬁrms compete in quan-
tities and plan simultaneously at D(0) = 0. Then sequential and alternating
planning constitutes the unique equilibrium.10
Proof If both ﬁrms set quantities and plan simultaneously at some fu-




0β2((β − γ)e3σ2u − βe−σ2u + γeσ2u)




0σ2(8β3 + 4β2γ − γ3)(eσ2v − e(σ2+r)u−rv)e(3σ2−r)u−σ2v
(r + σ2)β(8β3 + 4β2γ − 2βγ2 − γ3)
.
(72)
Along similar lines as in the proofs of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 it can be
shown, that for every third planning date v of ﬁrm j there exists a unique
u?(v) that is increasing in v. Using that the equilibrium distance between
planning dates implies that v = 2u in (72) yields that simultaneous planning
cannot be an equilibrium.
Now consider the scenario with sequential planning. If ﬁrm j plans for
the second time at some future instant s and for the third time at some
future instant v then the condition that determines ﬁrm i0s optimal second
10Unique here refers to the structure of planning dates. Of course, the equilibrium in
not unique in determining which of the ﬁrms plans ﬁrst and which one follows







8β4(e3σ2u − e−σ2u) + 8β3γ(e−σ2(u−2s) − e−σ2(u−4s))
+ 4β2γ2(eσ2(u+2s) − e3σ2u) + 2βγ3(e−σ2(u−4s) − eσ2(u+2s))







(r + σ2)β(4β2 − γ2)2
×

16β4e2σ2u + 4β2γ2(e2σ2s − 2e2σ2u) − 2βγ3e2σ2s + γ4(2e2σ2u − e2σ2s.
(73)
Again it can be shown along similar lines as in the proofs of Lemma 4 and
Lemma 5, that for every second planning date s and every third planning
date v of ﬁrm j, with s < u < v there exists a unique u??(v,s) that is
increasing in v and decreasing in s. However, sequential planning can only
be an equilibrium if (73) and (66) are jointly satisﬁed for some (s,u,v)-
combination, which fulﬁlls the requirement that the equilibrium distance of
planning dates under sequential planning implies that v = 2u−s. It can be
shown, that there exists a unique (s,u,v)-combination satisfying v = 2u−s
for which (73) and (66) are jointly fulﬁlled. Thus there exists a unique
equilibrium in planning dates in which ﬁrms plan sequentially and in an
alternating manner under Cournot competition. 
5 Extension
In this section we discuss two possible extensions of our model. The ﬁrst
one is to allow for two diﬀerent demand shocks and the second extension
deals with asymmetric starting dates.
5.1 Diﬀerent demand shocks
In our model we assumed that both ﬁrms’ demand curves are hit by the
same shock, θt. Yet, since ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated products this must
not necessarily be the case. This idea can be incorporated in our analysis





































t are two diﬀerent shocks that are (less than perfectly) pos-
itively correlated. We think that our results will hold qualitatively in this
more general setting, since the driving forces of the basic model are still at
work here. Still, ﬁrms would choose to plan simultaneously under Bertrand
competition and sequentially under Cournot competition.
Another restriction in our model is that the shock that enters the inter-
cept and the shock that aﬀects the slope of the inverse demand curve are
perfectly positively correlated. However, introducing two diﬀerent but cor-
related shocks into the (inverse) demand of a single ﬁrm would considerably
complicate the problem, without aﬀecting our results qualitatively as long
as the correlation between the shocks remains positive. Yet, if the shocks
are independent or even negatively correlated it is less obvious whether a
planning ﬁrm still reduces the uncertainty of its competitor’s residual de-
mand under quantity competition or increases it under price competition.
The details of such an analysis are left for future research.
5.2 Asymmetric starting dates
We have assumed that ﬁrms start at the same time and have perfect and
symmetric information when the game starts. This is a realistic description
in a setting in which ﬁrms enter the market at the same time. Yet, in
many industries ﬁrms enter the market sequentially, which implies that ﬁrms
start out with sequential planning dates. In this context the question arises
whether sequential planning is an equilibrium under price competition or if
ﬁrms planning dates ﬁnally converge to the simultaneous planning scenario.
Extending the model along this line would shed light on the question whether
our assumption of a simultaneous ﬁrst planning date is innocuous or drives
the result that ﬁrms synchronize their planning decision under Bertrand
competition. We are currently exploring that question.
Here we brieﬂy mention some of the mechanisms that are at work in
a setting with a sequential ﬁrst planning date: At the date at which the
second ﬁrm enters the market it is forced to plan. This decision increases
the uncertainty for the incumbent at this instant. If this increase in the
expected incorrectness of the beginning ﬁrm’s plan is suﬃciently high, it
will plan immediately. It follows from the results obtained in the preceding
32analysis that if ﬁrms plan simultaneously for once then they will continue
to plan simultaneously at all future planning dates.
If, however, the increase in the expected incorrectness of the beginning
ﬁrm’s plan is not high enough to trigger immediate planning, then the be-
ginner chooses to plan at some later date and possibly ﬁrms end up in the
sequential and alternating scenario. This may happen because by planning
the second ﬁrm increases the beginner’s uncertainty. Thus the beginner
chooses to plan earlier compared to the situation in which there is no en-
trant. But with its planning decision the beginning ﬁrm itself increases the
expected incorrectness of the entrant’s plan and so the entrant itself chooses
to plan earlier, too. However, we can currently not rule out that this ”con-
vergence” stops at some point before planning dates are synchronous and
that there is indeed an equilibrium in which price-setting ﬁrms choose to
plan sequentially conditional on starting asymmetrically. If ﬁrms compete
in quantities we do not expect that the assumption of asymmetric starting
dates changes the equilibrium structure of planning dates qualitatively. The
reason for this conjecture is, that under Cournot competition and a simul-
taneous start the unique equilibrium structure of planning dates is already
sequential. Thus if ﬁrms start by planning sequentially ﬁrms should remain
in this scenario.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a model of dynamic duopolistic competition in
which ﬁrms face costs of absorbing and processing information. We have
shown that ﬁrms choose to synchronize their decisions under Bertrand com-
petition while they plan in an asynchronous and alternating manner under
Cournot competition. This result relies mainly on the eﬀect, that by plan-
ning the attentive ﬁrm re-optimizes its plan and thereby reduces or expands
the incorrectness of the other ﬁrm’s plan. This mechanism is completely un-
related to the fact that quantities are strategic substitutes and that prices
are strategic complements. Furthermore our analysis does not rely on any
exogenous device that would equip ﬁrms with some kind of commitment
power. Thus the results derived in this paper add a new argument to the
discussion of whether ﬁrms synchronize or asynchronize their decision mak-
ing.
An interesting way for future research might be to incorporate some form
of endogenous commitment on the side of ﬁrms into our recursively state
contingent planning costs model. A uniﬁed analysis of these two approaches
33would shed light on the question how both eﬀects interact and which one
dominates under which circumstances. This approach would add more real-
ism to the analysis and one can possibly derive clear-cut predictions about
which eﬀect dominates in which industry.
7 Appendix
Lemma 1. Let zt be a standardized Brownian motion. The corresponding
geometric Brownian motion, θt, with starting value θ0 and standard devia-






























with a,b ∈ Z.
Proof: Consider two points in time s and u, with 0 < s < u. Let zt be
a standardized Brownian motion and let θt be the corresponding geometric
Brownian motion represented in (74). By using the result that exp(x)a =
exp(ax), θa
s and θb





























































Where the random variable
Z := σb(zu − zs) + σ(a + b)zs,
34is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
v2 := σ2

b2(u − s) + (a + b)2s

.





= exp(v2/2). Simplifying the corresponding ex-
pression yields (75). 
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